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THE PROBLEMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT FROM THE
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Much has been written during recent years about the defects
of American municipal government. And all sorts of remedies
have been proposed, and many of them piit to the test of expe-
rience. Discussion and agitation, followed by legislation and the
election of better official, have wrought great improvement in many
communities; and even the most recent disclosures of intolerable
conditions have been signs of an awakened public opinion and the
direct cause of uprooting some evils. But no one has suggested
that we have as yet reached a state of perfection in municipal gov-
ernment, or that we are in any immediate danger of attaining such a
state.
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss all of the problems
that have arisen in connection with our municipal affairs, nor to pro-
pose remedies for all of the difficulties and evils that still exist. No
attention will be given to such questions as the scope of municipal
functions or the political substructure underlying the organization of
government. The task here undertaken is to consider only those
features of the complex municipal situation on which a student of
public administration may be supposed to be able to throw some
light.
These features may be considered under two main heads: ( )
the problems connected with the local machinery of municipal or-
ganization and the inter-relations of local officials ; and (2) the
problems connected with the relations of the city to the government
of the state. Under each division, the existing arrangements will be
briefly summarized, their defects will be pointed out and the vari-
ous remedies hitherto applied, and plans will be suggested for future
action. It will be admitted frankly that no scheme of purely ad-
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ministrative reform will offer a complete solution of all the munici-
pal problems; but it is a false logic which deduces from this the
belief that administrative reform is of no importance; and this
paper is written in the conviction that some of the fundamental diffi-
culties are administrative in character, and that administrative re-
forms are among the essential conditions of successful municipal
government in this country. The basis for the discussion of admin-
istrative reforms will be found in a municipal program, adopted
by the National Municipal League ; but amendments to this plan as
seem desirable will also be suggested.
I. Local Organization.
One of the first facts that becomes obvious to any student of
municipal government in the United States is the confused and com-
plicated variety of local administrative arrangements, and the lack of
consistent principles of municipal organization, not only in the cities
as a whole, but even in most of the cities taken individually. Start-
ing with a simple system of council government, this was first altered
about 1820 by a limited application of the theory of the separation
of legislative and executive powers in the popular election of mayors;
while subsequently (since 1850) the division of municipal powers
in the hands of separate and largely independent authorities has
been developed to a remarkable degree, without any guiding prin-
ciple and in a way that defies generalization or classification. In
more recent years, some of our cities have secured a system of
municipal organization based in part at least on some fundamental
ideas. These have been for the most part a stricter application of
the theory of separation of the legislative and executive powers,
with the concentration of the latter in the hands of the chief execu-
tive, as in the national administration; but in a few cases the cen-
tralization of authority in the hands of the mayor has tended
towards the abandonment of the theory of separation.
There are two factors in American municipal organization
which are practically universal, and may therefore be taken as the
necessary bases for any systematic scheme. These are a council and
a mayor, both elected directly by popular vote. Washington, D. C.,
is the only city which has been an exception to this rule for any
considerable length of time ; and the administrative arrangements
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there could not be well applied elsewhere, even if they formed in
themselves a correlated and consistent scheme of organization.
The Council.
When we turn to examine the structure and powers of these
two common factors, we find ourselves at once in the midst of di-
versity and often of confusion. The typical form of the council is
that of a single body elected by wards or districts for a one or two
year term. Many of the large cities-six out of the twelve with
over 300,000 population-have a bicameral council. In many of
these the smaller branch of the council is elected from the whole
city instead of by districts; the cities in Ohio, Indiana and Iowa and
some others have a small number of councilmen elected at large, in
addition to the ward representatives; and in San Francisco and a
few other cities the whole membership of the council is chosen at
large. In most American cities council members now receive some
compensation; but the older rule of gratuitous service still pre-
vails in New England, Pennsylvania, and is frequently found in
Southern cities and occasionally in other parts of the country.
Almost every one of these elements of council organization has
been the subject of criticism. It is pointed out that a single council
elected by wards, even if successful in representing the local inter-
ests of the various districts, makes no adequate provision for the
general interest of the whole city. In addition the district system
offers other difficulties in cities, and especially in large cities. The
ward limits are artificial and seldom represent any natural social
grouping of the population. Frequent changes of boundaries and
the constant changes of residence on the part of the people hinder
the development of a common social life within the political district.
While even in the face of readjustments of boundaries, popula-
tion movements go on so rapidly that there is seldom even the
crudest approximation to representation in proportion to population;
and in the largest cities at least the districts over-represented are
those in the control of the worst elements in the population.
A bicameral council with one house elected at large might seem
to meet some of these objections; but in fact, as generally estab-
lished, it simply adds another body chosen in a way which prevents
the representation of different interests, and thus weakens the de-
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liberative character of the council. In practical experience, too,
it has not been found that the bicameral system is in any way
necessary, or that it secures any improvement in the management
of municipal affairs.
In reference to salaries, it is urged on the one hand that no
payment induces aldermen to accept or to demand compensation
for their services in an irregular way, which often becomes either
a system of bribery or blackmail; and on the other hand it is said
that any salary makes the post one for which impecunious poli-
ticians will enter into active competition.
The plan of the National Municipal League recommends the
election of a single chambered city council on a general ticket, al-
though providing for the possible retention of the district system in
cities of over 25,ooo. Does not this go too far in ignoring the idea
of local representation? It may be admitted that the present ward
system is usually unsatisfactory; but are there not in every city
sectional divisions with tolerably distinct municipal interests and
some elements of common social life? Such divisions ought to be
recognized and emphasized in the political system. They should
have fairly permanent boundaries; and the district for electing
council members should be also a district for other municipal pur-
poses, such as schools, police, fire brigade and the like, and indeed
still further for larger political interests, such as the election of
members of the state legislature. By thus concentrating the political
interests of the same people in a common district, the germ of social
unity and local spirit could be highly developed. Such districts
would ordinarily be larger than city wards at the present time, and
the internal transfers of population within the city would be more
largely within the district, and would thus more often be made
without requiring any readjustment of political relations. Moreover,
as each district would have several members in the council, the
exact number could be adjusted at frequent intervals in proportion
to the changes in population, without changing district boundaries.
Besides such a district system, the plan now in use in several
states of the Middle West, of electing a small number of members
of the council at large also seems desirable. Such members would
probably be more widely known throughout the city, and likely on
this account to be men of large ability and character, and also likely
to secure better consideration for the questions where local interests
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should give way to more general views. It may further be noted
that these arrangements are adapted to various forms of minority
and proportional representation; but even without this feature the
district members will undoubtedly include representatives of differ-
ent shades of political opinion on various questions of public policy,
and the council will thus continue to be a body adapted to delibera-
tion and discussion.
A system of council organization somewhat similar to that out-
lined was in operation in New York City from 1873 to 1882. And
it is perhaps worthy of note that during this decade there was
less criticism of municipal government in the metropolis than in any
other period of equal length for the last fifty years, and that the
abandonment of the system was due, not to any public dissatisfac-
tion, but apparently for the sole purpose of strengthening the sys-
tem of party machinery and increasing partisan influences in the
municipal government.
An examination of the powers of municipal councils involves
two distinct-or at least distinguishable-topics: the subject matter
of council activity, and the methods of council action. In both fields
the diversity of detail and the difficulty of generalization is enor-
mous. It may, however, be said, under the first head, that municipal
councils generally have some power in reference to the protection
of persons and property and the construction and management of
local works of public improvement, and often they have some con-
trol over public charity; but seldom do they have much direct voice
in reference to public education. In any case the authority of the
council is strictly limited to the specific grants made by the state
legislature. These legislative grants are not given in general terms,
but are minutely enumerated, and the courts have uniformly applied
the doctrine of strict construction to all such grants. In conse-
quence, while in the smaller cities the councils have ordinarily about
as much authority as they wish to exercise, in the larger cities where
the need and demand for municipal action is much greater, the
councils are constantly appealing to the legislature for larger powers.
Methods of council action may be considered as legislative or
administrative. In their constitution, municipal councils are organ-
ized on similar principles to our legislatures; and this idea has been
retained in the plan proposed in this paper. And in a vague sense
the councils have been considered as the body in the municipal gov-
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ernment corresponding to the legislatures in the state and national
governments. But it must be said that the law-makers have never
thoroughly recognized this. Indeed, the judicial doctrine laid down
as a general rule, that all legislative power not granted to Congress
is vested in the state legislatures and may not be delegated, is in
direct contradiction to the idea that the councils are legislative bodies.
Nevertheless, some state constitutions have expressly provided that
local legislative power may be delegated to local bodies; while the
body of statutory legislation on municipal government does in fact
give a certain amount of legislative power to municipal councils.
Legislative power as exercised by Congress and the state legis-
latures seems to consist of three main elements: the power to enact
laws applying to the community at large; the power to organize a
system of officials and regulate their functions, and the power to
levy taxes and appropriate money to maintain the administrative
system thus organized. Municipal councils have the first of these
to a limited degree, in their power to enact local ordinances and by-
laws on specified subjects. But such ordinance power is sometimes
given to administrative authorities such as boards of health, police
commissioners and park boards. They have the third class of
powers also to a more or less limited extent. But they have in most
cases only a most restricted authority in reference to powers of the
second class.
As to the power over administrative organization, municipal
charters usually provide so completely for all the officials of any
importance, that the municipal councils find little scope for further
action except in the .creation of minor positions such as milk inspec-
tors or sealers of weights and measures; and in many of the larger
cities this power of establishing minor offices is vested not in the
council, but in an authority supposed to be administrative,-while
in the new Ohio code such power has been given to the boards of
public service in every city in that state. In this respect city char-
ters have carried to an absurd extreme a feature of our state con-
stitutions, where these have departed from the altogether excellent
model laid down .in the national constitution.
One state stands out as a notable exception to this rule. The
municipal corporation act of Illinois, after providing for a com-
paratively small number of officials in every city, authorizes the
municipal council by a two-thirds vote to establish such other offices
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as it deems necessary, and to discontinue any of these offices by a
like vote at the end of a fiscal year. Thus in the city of Chicago
such important offices as that of comptroller and commissioner of
public works have been established by council ordinance.
In the exercise of such legislative powers as they have, munici-
pal councils are generally restricted by the veto power of the mayor,
in the same way as Congress and most of the state legislatures are
restricted by the veto power of the President and governors.
In most of the smaller cities, and in New England and Penn-
sylvania even in cities of considerable size, municipal councils still
retain and exercise many administrative powers. To some extent
these powers are exercised by the council as a whole, by the issuance
of specific orders to agents and employees, and by the appointment
of officials and their subordinates. In other respects, such powers
are exercised immediately by council committees, who have direct
supervision over the municipal employees. Even in the larger cities
where these powers are no longer in the hands of the councils, ap-
pointments to offices are effective only after being confirmed by them,
this control over appointments being sometimes used to secure some
patronage for the individual members. In Chicago and many of the
large cities, as well as the smaller ones, the council through its Fi-
nance Committee is the controlling factor in initiating proposals for
expenditure as well as in passing the appropriations; but in the larger
cities of New York state and some other cities the budget is pre-
pared by a small administrative board, and the council is not per-
mitted to appropriate more than the sums provided in the budget.
Under the program of the National Municipal League, the
scope of municipal action would be vastly increased. The ordinance
power is to include general authority in reference to the &dquo;good gov-
ernment, order and security of the city and its inhabitants.&dquo; Broad
grants of power to deal with public works, institutions and certain
commercial undertakings are given; and these are made effective
by a comprehensive grant of taxing power. The council is made the
general legislative authority in all matters, subject, however, to the
veto power of the mayor; and with detailed restrictions in reference
to granting away rights and franchises in the public streets. The
council, too, is to have almost complete power in organizing the
administrative departments. On the other hand, the council can-
not appoint to any office, except that of comptroller; and it seems to
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be intended that the council shall have no powers of direct adminis-
tration.
Several recent municipal charters have provisions along the
line of those recommendations. The general law for the four cities
of the second class in New York state vests the legislative power
and only the legislative power in the city councils. A more emphatic
statement is placed in the new. charter of Portland, Ore.; and an-
other in the latest ( i9oo) charter of the city of New York. But it
would seem that these clauses refer only to the ordinance power;
and the equally important power of organizing administrative offices
has apparently been effectively granted only in the law of Illinois
previously mentioned.’
It is not entirely clear that all municipal councils should be
restrained from exercising any administrative functions. In small
cities where the amount of municipal work is limited, there is no
absolute necessity for separating legislative and administrative func-
tions, and council committees may well discharge the latter duties
and save the expense of additional officials. In large cities, the
distinction is much more important; the increased volume of busi-
ness makes too great a demand on the time of aldermen than can
safely be demanded from the kind of men who ought to be mem-
bers of the councils; and better administrative management can be
secured by specializing that work in the hands of experts in the
different fields who can be paid to give their whole time to the
municipal service.
&dquo;With a careful separation of powers the legislative function
can be entrusted to typical everyday Americans from middle life
who yet have broad enough training to enable them to see the
interests of the city as a whole. In most cities strictly legislative
duties would not seriously interfere with a man’s regular business,
and therefore the councilmen need not either be rich or receive high
salaries from the city.&dquo;2
The Mayor.
The mayor has the longest pedigree of any of our American
public officers. As far back as the sixth century we hear of the
1 In Michigan where the state constitution specifically authorizes the legislature to confer
local legislative power on city councils, the Supreme Court has held that this applies only to
the power of passing general ordinances, and that the legislature may not delegate to city
councils the power of organizing-administrative departments.
2 Wilcox: The American City, p. 306.
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mayors of the palace in the Frankish kingdoms, the last of whom,
Karl Martel, was grandfather to the Emperor Charlemagne. A
few centuries later the name appears again both in France and Eng-
land as the chief officer of a city, and in that capacity it has come
down to our own time. American mayors occupy an intermediate
position between the purely honorary and social dignity of the Eng-
lish ofhce and the professional public administrator of Germany, with
a tendency in recent years to confer on the officer legal powers in
some respects analogous to those of a mayor in France. In this
country the office is filled by direct popular vote, for terms varying
from one to four years. The one year term is too short; it should
be at least two. In most cities of over 2~,000 population, and in
many smaller cities, the incumbent receives a salary,-in cities with
over ioo,ooo population, usually from $2,000 to $5,ooo a year, and in
five cities from $10,000 to $i5,ooo.3
Although generally considered as primarily an executive officers,
the mayor has always had important duties in relation to the coun-
cil and legislative matters. In small cities, he is in most cases the
presiding officer of the council; and has this position even in such
important cities as Chicago, Providence and Grand Rapids. In the
last named he also appoints the committees of the council. But
in most of the larger cities this connection of the mayor with the
council has ceased. On the other hand, in all the larger cities and
many small cities, he has a limited veto over the acts of the council,
which in many cases includes the power to disapprove items in
appropriation bills, sometimes includes the power to disapprove sep-
arate provisions of any ordinance, and in a few cities is made more
effective than the veto power of the President and state governors
by requiring a larger vote than the traditional two-thirds to over-
ride his disapproval. In the cities of New York state; the mayors
have an additional legislative power to disapprove special acts of the
state legislature applying to their cities, this disapproval operating
as a veto unless the legislature repasses the bill.
In respect to administrative powers, the principles of executive
authority employed in the national government have been but slowly
and partially applied to city mayors. In many small cities, and in
some of considerable size (the latter mostly in New England and
Ohio) the mayor has even yet little or no appointing power and no
3 Racine, Wisconsin, seems to be the largest city where no salary is paid.
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effective means of controlling the other officials; and has thus still
less relative authority than most of the state governors. In other
cities, including most of the larger places, he now generally has
powers analogous to those of a state governor: the right to nominate
to the council for the principal positions not filled by popular elec-
tion, and some power of removing officials for cause. In Illinois
cities, the scope of this limited power over appointments may be
greatly enlarged as the council creates new offices ; and in the same
state the mayor has also a large power of removal which gives him
effective means of control over the other officials and strengthens
his influence in appointments. In Chicago the mayor’s power of
nomination extends to most of the important positions, and in prac-
tice has been equivalent to the absolute power of appointment. In
Cleveland for twelve years ( z8gi-z9o3) the mayor had a very ex-
tended power of nomination, which in practice operated to give him
complete control over most of the important positions.
During the last ten years, in a number of important cities, the
mayor’s power of appointment and removal has been still further
increased. The mayors of the six largest cities in New York state,
of Boston, of all cities in Indiana, and of a few other cities have now
the sole and absolute power of appointing the heads of most of the
municipal departments; and in the same cities, with the addition of
the four largest cities in Pennsylvania, mayors have the power of
removing at any time the appointed heads of departments. Under
this system the executive authority and responsibility is concentrated
in the mayor, except for a few officials still elected by popular vote.
In the program of the National Municipal League, this latest
development of the mayor’s authority is adopted, and indeed
strengthened by making the mayor the only elective executive officer,
and extending his power of appointment and removal to all admin-
istrative officers except the comptroller. At the same time the
mayor’s limited veto power over council ordinances is retained; and
he is also to prepare and submit the annual budget.
This concentration of executive authority in the hands of the
mayor has been criticized, as enabling that official to use his power
to build up a &dquo;political machine.&dquo; This was the main argument of
those who planned the recent Ohio municipal code, which relegates
the mayor to a position of &dquo;innocuous desuetude,&dquo; yet the system
there established was that which has enabled one of the most notori-
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ous &dquo;machines&dquo; in the country to be maintained in the city of Cin-
cinnati. Every system of appointment or election can be abused in
this way, so long as positions in the municipal service are given as
rewards for campaign work. The complete plan of the National
Municipal League will restrict the possibility of this abuse to small
limits by the merit system in filling all subordinate positions; and it is
felt that the importance of the principal officers and the responsibility
of the mayor’s power will in most cases secure the appointment of
competent heads of departments.
One writer in a very recent article advocates a still further
development of executive authority.4 He holds that the organic
defect in municipal organization &dquo;lies in the fact that the executive
and legislative departments, in addition to being separately consti-
tuted, are also disconnected, and this very disconnection has prevented
in practice the degree of separation in their functions which their
integrity requires.&dquo; His remedy is to give the executive complete
legislative initiative, with the right to demand a vote on proposed
measures.
Administrative Department.
Our discussion of the officials who deal with particular branches
of municipal administration must be very brief. Any description of
existing arrangements is out of the question, for the situation may
well be described as chaotic :-a chaos in regard, to the forms of
organization, the terms of service, the methods of election or appoint-
ment, and the relations of the various officials to the council, to the
mayor and to each other. A large element of variety in some of
these respects is almost inevitable: the number of officials and sepa-
rate departments must vary with the size of the city and the scope
of municipal functions; and the extent to which unsalaried service
can be advantageously secured can hardly be fixed by a hard and
fast rule. But the existing confusion goes far beyond what is either
necessary or excusable; and is the cause of constant friction and
dissatisfaction in municipal operations.
Something may be said about conditions in those cities where
a more orderly system has been introduced. Most of the cities
where the mayor’s power has been increased, place single sal-
aried commissioners at the head of the various departments, and
4H. J. Ford, in Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1904.
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some other large cities, e. g., Detroit, have also partially introduced
this same feature. But in every case some branches of administra-
tion remain under the supervision of boards, and there is no fixed
rule as to which departments are under boards and which under
single commissioners.
In most cities the various municipal bureaus form a hetero-
geneous list, frequently numbering from twenty to thirty or more,
with no official connection even between those whose duties are most
closely related. But a number of cities have made progress in group-
ing related ofhces into important departments. Thus in St. Louis the
heads of the various public works bureaus, including the parks,
streets, sewers and water bureaus, are brought together in the board
of public improvements; and in the larger cities of New York and
Pennsylvania the public works department has been made to include
most of the bureaus of this kind. In Ohio cities, under the new
code, the department of public service embraces not only the man-
agement of all the municipal engineering works, but also the chari-
table and correctional institutions, going too far in combining unre-
lated offices. Another development has been in establishing depart-
ments of public safety, bringing together the police and fire brigades
and usually also the ofhces for sanitary and building inspection.
This department is now to be found in some of the larger cities of
New York, Pennsylvania and Indiana, in all the Ohio cities, and
occasionally in other places.
Most advance in this direction is to be found in the four cities
of the second class in New York state. Here practically all the
municipal service is organized in seven main departments. This
plan seems to have been taken, with some modifications, from the
so-called &dquo;federal plan&dquo; of Cleveland (18gr-I903) ; and another
feature of that plan is authorized in the New York cities, viz: the
periodic meetings of the heads of departments with the mayor, as a
cabinet for the discussion of questions of common interest to secure
agreement on harmonious lines. In Cleveland the &dquo;cabinet&dquo; was
constituted as a board of control with important legal powers; but
in the New York cities it has been left to develop its own place in
the municipal system.
In the new municipal code of Indiana (1905) from five to eight
departments are established in cities .of over io,ooo population, and
provision is made for monthly meetings of the mayor and the heads
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of departments. This &dquo;cabinet’.’ is authorize to adopt rules and
regulations for the administration of the departments, including
rules governing admission to the subordinate municipal service.
The plan of the National Municipal League does not provide in
detail for the administrative departments; but leaves these to be
organized by the council or by the special locally framed charters
according to the needs of the city. But there is certainly need in
most cities for more careful attention to this problem of departmental
organization; and the larger cities of the country will find the plans
that have been mentioned well worth their attention.
Subordinate positions in the municipal service in most cities
are filled and held at the pleasure of the changing heads of depart-
ments and bureaus. And one of the most serious abuses in municipal
administration has been the frequent changes in such positions for
partisan and political purposes. In the cities of Massachusetts and
New York, and in Philadelphia, Chicago and New Orleans the sys-
tem of open competitive examinations has been established. And in
some other cities the police and fire departments are recruited under
a merit system. There can be no question that the principles of
civil service reform should be thoroughly applied to the whole munic-
ipal service.
II. The City and the State.
Of equal importance with the problem of local organization
are the problems of the relations between the city and the state. For
in the United States, as in all other countries, cities are not indepen-
dent political communites, but districts in a larger political area and
subordinate in various ways to the higher governmental authorities.
In the United States this subordination is to the government of the
states. There are many evidences that the prevailing relations be-
tween the city and state authorities are unsatisfactory, and the
remedy most widely suggested is a demand, usually vague and inar-
ticulate, for municipal &dquo;home rule.&dquo; Some attention may therefore
be given to explaining the present arrangements and to presenting a
definite plan for a better system.
At the outset it may be noted that in our fundamental political
document, the national constitution, cities are in no way recognized
as having any existence; and that under the principle of residual
powers, the cities are created by the states, which have complete
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power of control over them, and may even destroy their political
existence.&dquo; But the powers of the states are for the most part exer-
cised by the state governments; and these are established and lim-
ited by the state constitutions. The more practical question is there-
fore as to the relations of the cities to the state legislatures, the
state executive and administrative authorities and the judiciary.
Legislative Control.
In the absence of specific limitations in the state constitutions,
the power of the legislature in most states is held by the courts. to be
practically co-extensive with the power of the states. A municipal
corporation has only such powers as are expressly enumerated or
clearly implied in its charter or the general laws ; and the legislature
&dquo;may, where there is no constitutional inhibition, erect, change,
divide and even abolish them at pleasure, as it deems the public
good to require.&dquo;6
In Michigan, however, and to a less extent in Indiana this doc-
trine has been somewhat modified; and the courts have held that the
legislature may not vest distinctively local powers, such as man-
agement of public works, in state officers, and may not compel a
city to undertake local improvements without its consent. More
generally, too, it has been held that the constitutional guarantees for
the protection of private property, prevent the legislature from con-
fiscating the private property of a city. But with these exceptions,
restrictions on the power of the legislature must be based on specific
constitutional provisions.
State legislatures, in the exercise of this power over cities, have
generally granted the authority to elect local ofhcials ; but have reg-
ulated in minute details the organization of the municipal govern-
ment and the powers and functions of the municipal officials. In
earlier days, and even at the present time for most small cities,
statutes on municipal government have usually been enacted only
on local initiative and, generally at the request of local members
of the legislature without consideration .by the whole legislature or
any public notice. As a result, there has accumulated a great mass
of special legislation in most of the states, overloading the statutes
with heterogeneous and conflicting provisions, which make almost
5U. S. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 17 Wall. 322 (1872).
6 Dillon Municipal Corporations, I, 93.
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impossible an intelligent understanding of municipal government and
dissipate and confuse responsibility for local affairs.
In most of the states containing large cities, legislation for their
government has been affected by other considerations. Charters
and charter amendments are passed not only without public and local
discussion, but also, in many cases, against the wishes of the local
officials and local members of the legislature. Sometimes such
legislation has had ostensibly at least, the immediate object of reme-
dying some municipal delinquency; but in many cases the most effec-
tive motive has been to secure some partisan advantage for those in
control of the state government, when the city officers belong to
another political organization; while in some instances such legisla-
tion has been enacted through the worst sort of political jobbery, to
confer privileges which could not be secured from the local authori-
ties. By such means acts have been passed substituting state ap-
pointed officials for local officers, compelling cities to carry out ex-
pensive and unnecesary undertakings, and granting franchises in the
public streets with little or no compensation to the city. The legis-
latures of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Missouri have been
most active in these methods of interference; but instances are not
lacking in Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan and other states.
It is over fifty years since the attempt was begun to remedy the
evils of special municipal legislation by constitutional provisions pro-
hibiting such legislation. The second constitution of Ohio, adopted
in 1851, contained several clauses intended to abolish special legisla-
tion on municipal government; other states followed this example, at
first slowly, but more rapidly since I870 ; and at the present time
about half of the states forbid the legislature to enact special muni-
cipal legislation. These provisions have, however, had only a partial
success. The method of detailed legislation enumerating municipal
officers and powers was so firmly established, that when it proved
difficult to pass laws of that nature applying to cities of all sizes,
the lawmakers, instead of changing their method of legislation,
devised methods of evading the constitutional provisions. The most
successful method was the device of classifying cities; as the courts
accepted a statute applying to a class of cities as a general law, even
if there were only a single city in a class. The smaller cities were
then grouped into one class, and a general law applied to them; but
each of the larger cities was usually placed in a class by itself; and
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the r6gime of special legislation with its evils of confusion, partisan-
ship and corruption continued, and indeed became worse tfian ever
with the development of cities in size and population.
In Illinois an effective general municipal law was enacted in
1872, which by granting large powers to all cities has been success-
ful in limiting special legislation in that state. But even there some
special legislation has been enacted, mainly because the financial
powers granted in the general law are not adequate to the needs of
the city of Chicago. In Ohio, too, after fifty years of classified legis-
lation, the Supreme Court of the state felt compelled in 1902 to
reverse its previous rulings and to declare that statutes for a class of
cities which in fact applied only to a single city were contrary to
the state constitution. The result was the enactment of a new muni-
cipal code applying to all the cities of that state, which, however,
still goes so much into detail that it burdens the smaller cities with a
too cumbersome machinery. The new municipal code of Indiana
reduces the number of classes of cities in that state to five. And
Virginia has a general municipal law, supplemented, however, by
some special legislation. In some other states the smaller cities are
organized under a general law.
New York state in 1894 adopted another method, in the attempt
to reduce the evils of legislative interference in municipal affairs.
The revised constitution of that year itself establishes three classes
of cities, and provides that any bill applying to less than all the cities
in one of these classes must be submitted to the city concerned, and if
disapproved by the mayor or the mayor and council must be repassed
by the legislature and signed by the governor before it can become
a law. These provisions have secured a greater amount of publicity
to special legislation and have prevented the enactment of some bills
rushed through the legislature without careful consideration. In
the case of bills passed towards the end of the session, the mayor’s
disapproval is also effective until the next session of the legislature.
But in many cases the mayor’s disapproval has served only to delay
the enactment; and partisan or corrupt influences have secured the
passage of measures over the local disapproval.
At the session of the Michigan legislature in 1903 a method of
procedure was adopted in reference to bills affecting the city of
Detroit, which secured the same advantage of publicity. At the
request of the Common Council of Detroit, no Detroit bill was placed
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on its third reading, until after a public hearing on the measure in
the city. Such hearings were held regularly on Saturday mornings
during the session, being attended by the local members of the
legislature, a committee of the council, the newspaper reporters, and
any one interested in particular bills. This procedure could be estab-
lished in every state, and it ought not to be a difficult matter to
secure it. During the year it was in operation in Michigan, it pre-
vented the enactment of all measures to which there was strong local
opposition. It has proved, however, inadequate as a means of secur-
ing needed legislation, owing to the difficulty of harmonizing the
different factors.
Another method which prevents some of the abuses of legisla-
tive interference is found in the constitutions of New York and
Kentucky, which provide that all local officers must be locally elected.
Even this, however, has been evaded by creating special districts
with appointive officers for the conduct of functions usually munici-
pal, or by transferring such functions and officers from the city to
the county.
Still another method found in several of the states west of the
Mississippi river, is that of allowing cities to frame their own char-
ters through a local convention analogous to a state constitutional
convention. A constitutional provision authorizing this was first
adopted in Missouri in 1875 for cities of over 100,000 population,
when it was early applied in the city of St. Louis and more recently
in Kansas City. In 1879 California adopted’a similar constitutional
provision to that of Missouri, which now applies to any city of over
3,500 population; and sixteen cities in that state are operating under
charters framed in this way. The same plan was adopted in the con-
stitution of Washington in 1889 for cities of over 20,000 population,
in Minnesota by constitutional amendment in i898 ; and in Colorado
in 1902 for every city of over 2,000 population. A similar procedure
was adopted by the legislature of Oregon for the city of Portland
in igoi. The same plan is adopted in the program of the National
Municipal League for cities of over 25,000 population.
This system of &dquo;home rule&dquo; charters secures to the cities a large
element of freedom from legislative interference. But the experience
of St. Louis, where police, excise and election administration has
been placed in the hands of state appointed ofhcials, on the ground
that these are state and not municipal interests, shows that it may
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not altogether abolish it. On the other hand, if these matters are
also excluded from legislative action, there is a serious danger that
municipal autonomy may be carried so far as to impair the sover-
eignty of the state, as has been recently urged by Governor Gage,
of California. It should also be noted that this system tends to
increase the confusion and complexity of the law on municipal gov-
ernment. In practice, too, there has sometimes been a long delay
in securing the adoption of a charter under this process. The first
charter submitted for Denver was rejected, and a second was framed
and adopted with too little consideration. In Minneapolis, three pro-
posed charters have failed of ratification; and the old discredited
system continues in operation.
These considerations, and the frequent misrule and corruption
in municipal government, make clear that the complete independence
of the city from the state is not a satisfactory remedy for legislative
interference. And while restrictions on special legislation and local
charter conventions for the larger cities are steps in the right direc-
tion, the limitation on legislative control which they involve must
be supplemented by the fuller development of other methods of
control, which will be free from the evils that have accompanied the
excessive dependence on the legislature. What these methods should
be may be suggested by an examination of other forms of control
already in existence.
Judicial Control.
To a considerable extent municipal officials are subject to the
control of the judicial authorities. Suits may be brought against
municipal corporations to enforce contract rights, and to some ex-
tent for damages due to negligence on the part of the agents of the
municipality. Suits for damages may also be brought against mu-
nicipal officials for acts performed without warrant of law. Munic-
ipal officials are also subject to criminal prosecution, not only for
purely private acts, but also for misconduct in connection with their
official duties. In addition to these judicial remedies to redress
wrongful acts, the courts also exercise some preventive control over
the acts of officials through the issue of writs of mandanus, injunc-
tion, certiorari, habeas corpus, quo warranto and the like by which
they enforce statutory provisions governing the powers and duties
of these ofhcials.
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There is little or no opposition to this judicial control, and
almost the only criticism made of it is that it is not always adequate
to meet the situation. Criminal prosecutions depend for their suc-
cess on the action of local prosecuting officers, local juries and local
judges, who may have close political relations with the ofhcials under
trial; but recent events in different parts of the country speak well
for the working of the local machinery of criminal justice. Other
difficulties arise from the precautions of our judicial system in favor
of persons accused of crime, which add to the difficulties of con-
viction, and often secure acquittal or a new trial on a technical appeal
to a higher court. And in the exercise of control through special
writs, judges are extremely careful not to interfere with the discre-
tionary powers of administrative officials,, even when these may have
been clearly abused. Evidently there is need for some further devel-
opment of state control. Something may perhaps be done in
strengthening the judicial powers in this direction; but something
of a different nature must be devised to exercise the supervision
heretofore so badly attempted through the detailed legislative con-
trol, whose abandonment has been urged.
fldyninistrative Control.
It remains to examine the supervision exercised by executive
and administrative officers of the central state governments. Fifty
years ago or less no such supervision existed over municipal officials,
nor was there any effective administrative supervision even of local
officials, such as sheriffs and prosecuting attorneys, who were clearly
and directly subordinate agents of the state governments. In Eng-
land from the time of the Normans to the Tudors the important local
officers had been both appointed by the Crown and closely supervised
in their actions by the Privy Council. But the internal conflicts of
the seventeenth century resulted in breaking up the machinery of
administrative control, although the principal local officials continued
to be appointed by the central government. This system was brought
over to the American colonies; but here it was completely decen-
tralized by substituting local election for central appointment, while
the r6gime of no administrative supervision was continued.
Compared with conditions in continental Europe or with those
in Great Britain at the present time, or even with our own national
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administration, central administrative control of local officials in the
American states is still very limited; and this is particularly so in
the case of municipal ofhcials. Nevertheless, there has been some
development in this direction from the conditions during the first
half of the nineteenth century; and an understanding of this devel-
opment and the present situation may serve to indicate some features
of our future policy. In this examination attention will be given to
administrative supervision not only over municipal officials, but over
all local officials established and authorized by the states.
Such supervision first appeared and has been furthest developed
in connection with educational administration. Here decentraliza-
tion was carried to the extreme in the petty school district; but over
the local school authorities there is now in all of the states a super-
intendent of public instruction, a board of education, or other cen-
tral authority. The powers of those state educational officials vary
to some extent; but in most states they have control over the dis-
tribution of state school funds, direct the county supervision of
schools, exercise control over the qualifications and training of
teachers, and receive reports from all local school officers. In some
states their powers are more extensive, most of all in New York,
where the commissioner of education exercises supervision over ele-
mentary, secondary and higher education; while everywhere the
state officials wield a large advisory influence beyond their compul-
sory powers.
Another field of state administrative supervision of local officials
is that of matters affecting the public health. Most of the states
have a state board of health, which act as bureaus of information
and advice to local health officers ; and in certain cases of delin-
quency can compel the local officers to take action.
In a similar way local charitable and correctional institutions
are, in some of the larger states, brought under the inspection of
state boards; which exercise an important advisory influence over
both local authorities and the legislature, and in some cases may
require the local officials to remedy serious defects or to introduce
improvements.
Some steps have also been taken in establishing administrative
supervision over local assessing officers. Many of the states now
have state boards of equalization, which revise the total assessed val-
uation of local districts, so as to apportion the state property tax
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more equitably. In a number of states, certain property formerly
assessed by local officers is now assessed by a state authority. And
in a few states, notably Wisconsin and Michigan, state tax commis-
sioners are given effective powers of supervision over local assessing
officers in assessing property even for local taxation.
A fairly uniform line of development has been followed in con-
nection with such state officials. When first established they are
only authorized to collect information and make recommendations.
Then this authority is made more effective by empowering them
to require reports and by enlarging their powers and means of in-
spection. This is followed by some negative or preventive control,
by the power to establish regulations, and in some cases by authority
to use compulsory processes or remove delinquent local officials.
It is generally recognized that the supervision of such state
authorities as have been noted has worked for the improvement of
public administration in the fields under their control. Even where
they have only informational and advisory functions, something has
been accomplished; and more has been done where their powers
and means are larger. They have had two distinct advantages over
the legislatures and legislative committees. In the first place, by
specialization of functions and longer service they become to some
extent at least experts in the particular subject; in the second place,
partisan influences have been to a large extent excluded, and the
control exercised has not been abused for partisan ends.
Would not a further development of such administrative super-
vision in municipal matters be advisable? Does not the existence of
so many associations of municipal officials, for the purpose of col-
lecting and comparing information about their work, show that in
this field as in others, while &dquo;power may be decentralized, knowl-
edge to be most useful must be centralized.&dquo;T The collection and
publication of municipal information can be more effectively done
by an official state authority than by purely voluntary action; and
the recommendations of such a central state bureau, based on ade-
quate and accurate data, would serve to solve many of the difficulties
of municipal administration.
Besides the work of information and advice, there are some
branches of municipal government where further state adminstra-
tive supervision would operate to the advantage both of the cities
7 J. S. Mill: Representative Government.
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and of the state as a whole. In the field of municipal finances the
task of securing satisfactory data can only be accomplished on the
basis of scientific and uniform method of keeping accounts in all
of the cities. In most American cities municipal accounts and finan-
cial reports are still unintelligible to the ordinary citizen; and even
where an understandable system is adopted in a particular city it
is likely to be of little use in making comparisons with other cities
using other systems. It is only on the basis of a uniform system
that accurate and comparable information can be secured; and this
can be secured only through a general law enforced by state officials.
Some progress has been made in this direction in a few states.
Wyoming for a number of years has had an examiner of public
accounts, exercising powers over the financial accounts and reports
of local officials similar to those in most states exercised over the
accounts of banking and insurance companies. More recently Mas-
sachusetts and New York have enacted statutes providing for uni-
form financial reports from cities; while Ohio four years ago estab-
lished an effective law for uniform municipal accounting in that
state under the direction of the auditor of the state. Similar meas-
ures are being discussed in other states; and should be encouraged.
Another field where there is special need for state administra-
tive supervision is that of the police. The courts have repeatedly
recognized that in the control over the police, municipal officials are
acting not as local authorities, but as agents of the state. And this
view has often been made the excuse for vesting the police adminis-
tration of some cities completely in state appointed authorities. This
special treatment of particular cities cannot be defended on any
general principle; but the judicial view of the state’s authority and
the interests of the state as a whole in an effective and honest police
administration do warrant a general system of supervision in this
field. This is not introducing any novel idea into our system of
government, nor does it require any elaborate system of pew officials
to put it into effect. All that is necessary is to energise one of the
oldest factors in our system of local government. Make it the speci-
fic duty of the county sheriffs, the responsible peace officers, to in-
spect the local police within their jurisdiction, and to report period-
ically to the governor of the state; and give to the governors in all
states- a power, now partially given in some,&dquo; to remove delinquent
sheriffs or other local police officers.
3 New York, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
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To summarize: The demand for municipal home rule should
be made more specific and more definite. It must be made clear
that what is wanted is, not a revolution involving the complete
separation of the cities from the state, but a larger freedom in
matters of local concern from the restrictions of detailed munic-
ipal legislation, while retaining the control of the judiciary and
asking for the assistance and supervision of state officers in securing
the highest and the best municipal administration in the world.
